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ABSTRACT
An experiment was conducted to test the notion that cognitive 
consistency is not a universal attribute, but is contingent upon 
such variables as cultural group, age, sex of subject, and the issue 
under consideration. In a 2 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 2 factorial design, 
North American and Cypriot subjects were given questionnaires 
which measured attitudes on three issues before and after the in­
troduction of a discrepant cognition. Subjects differed in evidenc­
ing cognitive consistency, or discrepancy-induced attidude change, 
with age and type of issue interacting with the cultural group. The 
sex of subjects also mediated the consistency effect, but yielded no 
significant interaction with the cultural group. The implications of 
the results for cognitive consistency theory were discussed. Find­
ings replicate data presented in earlier studies with Greek and 
American populations reported in The International Journal of 
Psychology, The Greek Review of Social Research, and elsewhere 
by the same authors.
The cognitive consistency or balance principle posits 
that an individual behaves so as to maximize the 
structural balance within his cognitive system. The 
principle derives essentially from Heider’s (1944, 1946) 
formulation that a person (P) tends to keep his senti­
ments regarding another person (O) in line with their 
mutual evaluation of an object, idea, or third person 
(X), forming the P-O-X triad.
As one writer (Zajonc, 1954) notes, Heider's balan­
ce concept «assumes that social perception obeys cer­
tain Gestaltlike structural principles, and that it is sub­
ject to Gestaltlike dynamics» (p. 339). The basic 
assumption is that cognitive units (e.g., a P-O-X triad­
ic social structure) can be classified in «steady» or «un­
steady» states, and that these cognitive units seek 
steady states. Steady states, further, are determined by 
the dynamic nature (positive or negative) of the ele­
ments of a cognitive unit. For example, one may view 
person P negatively and person O positively, express­
ing the dynamic character of P and O. When all ele­
ments of a unit are of the same sign, a steady state (or 
cognitive balance) is said to exist. Hence P+ and 0 + 
are taken together without «cognitive strain» (i.e., in a 
balanced manner) and P+ and O- are perceived as 
unbalanced. These relationships reflect the Gestalt no­
tions of cohesive and restraining forces.
The aspect of a cognitive unit which the balance 
phenomenon deals with is attitude. Attitudes can be 
reflected in relationships, Heider proposes, of two 
kinds: sentiment and unit. A sentimental relationship is 
one in which person P likes or dislikes another person, 
O (PL + O, PL " O), or in which P or O like or dis­
like a third person, some issue, or some object (PL + 
X, PL ~ X; OL + X, OL ~ X). A unit relationship is
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symbolized by U: PU + X, OU — X (P has a dog, O 
does not have a dog), in transition from the earlier 
work on the perception of causality (1944), Heider 
changed some fundamental nomenclature, so that after 
the first statement of cognitive balance theory as such 
(1946), there arose confusion as to the distinction bet­
ween sentiment and unit relationships. Subsequent 
theoretical and empirical elaborations make no real 
distinction between the two.
In terms of the P-O-X triadic relationships, balance 
theory makes a statement of the following order: 
When three relationships in a triad are positive or 
when two of the relationships are negative and one is 
positive, the triad is balanced.
Balanced
1) PL + O, PL + X, OL + X
Joe likes Pete and both Joe and Pete like cars.
2) PL - O, PL + X, OL - X [PL ~ O, PL ~ X, OL +
XI
Joe does not like Pete; Joe likes cars; Pete does not 
like cars. |Joe and Pete are reversed in sentiments 
regarding carsi.
Unbalanced
1) PL + O, PL - X, OL + X, |PL + O, PL + X, OL ~
XI
Joe likes Pete; Joe does not like cars; Pete likes 
cars. |Joe and Pete are reversed in sentiments 
regarding carsi.
In short, one tends to dislike those with whom he dis­
agrees (or disagree with those whom he dislikes) and 
to like those with whom he agrees (or agree with those 
whom he likes).
We have used both the concepts of tendency and 
disposition (cognitive units seeking steady states) to 
describe the balance phenomenon. Heider more ac­
curately conceived of balance in terms of cognitive 
preferences (1958, pp. 204-205). The closest parallels 
to balance preferences, Zajonc (1954) suggests, are the 
Gestalt forces towards «good forms» in object percep­
tion. The nature of this preference is unclear. There is 
no claim for a noxious state in the absence of 
cognitive balance, discounting any drive analog in its 
operation. Nonetheless, Heider clearly states that, at 
the very least, social perception is mediated by the 
consistency principle and that the principle is a more 
or less universal motivational attribute of social per­
ception.
Subsequent extensions of Heider’s work, Newcomb 
(1953), Cartwright and Harary (1956), Abelson and 
Rosenberg (1958), and others, have shifted the 
emphasis of cognitive balance to interpersonal and in­
trapersonal relationships viewed as cognitive dynamics 
in which the focus is primarily on change. And if 
Heider was in any sense unclear about the nature of 
balance preferences, this later emphasis on social 
dynamics gives definite ascendancy to the concep­
tualization of consistency as a motivational 
phenomenon.
Supporting empirical evidence. Most early empirical 
studies testing Heider’s theory of an underlying dis­
position towards cognitive balance asked the subject to
play the role of an hypothetical person and supply the 
missing bond in a triadic unit. Jordan (1953), for ex­
ample, asked subjects to imagine themselves as some 
person P who liked person O and maintained, along 
with O, some relationship to X. The Jordan study 
generally supported Heider’s notion as measured by 
the experimental subjects’ self-reported preference for 
balanced triadic structures. Horowitz, Lyons, and 
Perlmutter (1951) demonstrated that evaluation of 
some event was largely dependent on the relationship 
between an experimental subject and the originator of 
the event, following the predictions of balance theory. 
A study by Festinger and Hutte (1954) established 
that the balance effect held for both North American 
and Low Country subjects, leading Heider (1958) to 
conclude that the balance effect is «independent of 
cultural differences» (p. 209).
Divergent empirical findings■ In 1957 Osgood, Suci, 
and Tannenbaum proposed that the preference for bal­
anced states is characteristic of persons with low in­
telligence and little education. Scott (1963) contends 
that persons whom he characterized as less cognitively 
complex have a more pronounced need for cognitive 
consistency. Osgood (1960) found that the tolerance of 
cognitive inconsistency increased with intelligence and 
decreased with heightened emotion. What these studies 
suggest is that, while balance preferences may mediate 
social perception, they are by no means a universal 
perceptual disposition.
Several studies, moreover, seem to link age, sex, and 
cultural variables to the would-be balance disposition. 
Wolf (1961), Gonzalez (1972), and Gonzalez and 
Maxwell (1973) demonstrated that the tendency to 
balance attitudes is a function of age. Gonzâlez (1974) 
found sex differences in the balance effect in a single 
age group, and Gonzâlez and Davis (1974) found sex 
differences across three age groups for North 
American and Greek subjects. Khokhlov and Gon- 
zàlez (1973) and Gonzâlez and Khokhlov (1974) 
report significant differences in the preference for 
balance among North American and Greek subjects, 
with significant differences by a^e and the type of 
cognitive unit presented.
The present study, which mapped the consistency 
effect across cultural, age, and sex differences, is 
meant as a review statement regarding the cluster of 
variables which these divergent empirical findings have 
established.
method
Subjects
Thirty male and thirty female North American and 
Cypriot Greek subjects participated in the study, with­
out financial remuneration for their work. In each 
culture three age subgroups of ten subjects each were 
formed among males and females: high school stu­
dents, with an age range of 16 to 18 years; college 
students ranging in age from 18 to 23 years; and post­
college subjects, with ages ranging from 24 to 29
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years. American college students were recruited from 
an Ivy League school in the United States, and 
American high school and post-college subjects from a 
population in Southern California. Cypriot subjects 
were chosen from a population in Nicosia, the capital. 
Cypriot college students were recruited from a 
technical frontistirion, the only counterpart in Cyprus 
of the typical American college.
Procedure
A questionnaire was written in English and Greek. 
Subjects were asked to indicate their sex and age and 
to consider three items which purported to test «at­
titudes towards various persons and issues». Subjects 
were assured that their responses would be kept anon­
ymous.
The first item (Task 1), in a classical balance 
paradigm, asked the subject (P) to assess his 
relationship to an unspecified acquaintance (O). The 
subject was then presented with a hypothetical positive 
relationship to a third person, a friend (X) [PL + X], 
His acquaintance (0) was noted as having made a 
negative response to the same third person (X) [OL ~ 
X], In the testing question, the subject was asked to 
repeat or, if applicable, reassess his attitude towards 
his acquaintance (O) on the basis of the conflicting or 
discrepant situation.
The second item (Task 2) repeated the same 
paradigm, but the key person (O) was now the sub­
ject’s father and the third person (X) the subject’s 
friend.
The third item (Task 3) concerned the subject’s 
country. Subjects were asked to indicate their feelings 
towards their country. They were then presented with 
the hypothetical event, that their country had just at­
tacked an innocent nation. Subsequent attitudes were 
then tested as in other items.
The three items were scored on a 10-point bipolar 
adjectival scale with endpoints marked «dislike» (1) 
and «like» (10). Subjects recorded initial attitudes 
before the introduction of a discrepant cognition (BD), 
and then following that introduction while in the dis­
crepant situation (ID). It was assumed that any 
change in the direction of lower assessment in the ID 
condition (i.e., significant BD-ID differences) would 
constitute attitude realignment in the face of discrepan­
cy and thus support for the consistency principle.
A sample item read as follows:
A is someone you know. How do you feel about him? 
(scale)
A feels like this about B:
(scale indicates 1 - - «dislike»)
You feel like this about B:
(scale indicates 10 -- «like»)
If you like B and A does not, how do you feel now 
about A?
(scale)
results
Attitude scores before (BD) and in (ID) the discrep­
ancy situation for both cultures were analyzed by the
sex of subjects and the age group for the three tasks. 
Mean attitude scores are presented in Table 1.
A 2 X 2 X 3 X 3 X 2 analysis of variance of at­
titude scores was performed for the factors culture, sex 
of subject, age, type of task, and discrepancy situation, 
with ten replications across subjects in each factorial 
grouping. A summary of the results of the analysis ap­
pears in Table 2.
The analysis of variance revealed significant effects 
for culture, sex of subject, age, type of task, and dis­
crepancy situation. The various interactions yielded 
evidence that the type of task, age, and the discrepan­
cy situation affected scores across the two cultures. 
The effect of the sex of the subject apparently 
transcended the cultural dimension, thus accounting 
for a nonsignificant two-way interaction for subject 
sex and culture. The effect of the sex of subjects in 
both cultures is also reflected in insignificant three and 
four way interactions where the culture and sex of 
subject factors were crossed.
For a detailed analysis of differences between fac­
torial groupings along the dimensions of culture, age, 
and sex of subject, a multivariate measurement profile 
was used (Overall & Klett, 1972). This analytical ap­
proach is closely related to the prototype of profile 
clustering research, which identifies naturally occurring 
groups or model types. The essence of multivariate 
analysis is the reduction of multiple measures to a 
single weighted composite. In the present study, the
TABLE 1. Table of Means for Attitude Scores before (BD) and in 
(ID) Discrepancy
Culture, Task Type
sex, and Friend · Father Country
age group BD ID BD ID BD ID
American
Male
High school 9.70 5.90 10.00 7.00 10.00 6.80
College 9.60 6.20 10.00 9.10 10.00 4.40
Post-college 10.00 7.50 10.00 9.00 10.00 7.10
Female
High school 9.70 7.20 9.70 8.90 10.00 7.70
College 9.70 7.40 10.00 9.30 10.00 7.20
Post-college 10.00 8.20 10.00 9.00 10.00 9.20
Cypriot
Male
High school 9.60 7.90 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
College 9.50 7.50 9.90 9.40 10.00 9.20
Post-college 9.50 6.70 9.90 9.90 9.70 9.40
Female
High school 9.80 9.60 9.90 9.90 10.00 10.00
College 9.70 9.70 9.80 9.70 10.00 10.00-
Post-college 9.60 9.60 10.00 9.80 10.00 10.00
Note: N = 10 subjects per left-hand column cell, with measures 
repeated across task type.
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TABLE 2. Summary of the Analysis of Variance of 
Attitude Scores
Source df MS F
Culture (A) 1 122.51 183.05***
Sex of Subject (B) 1 55.00 82.18***
Age (C) 2 5.09 7.60***
Task type (D) 2 43.40 64.87***
Discrepancy situation (E) 1 345.83 516.72***
A X B 1 .50 0.75
A X C 2 1 1.22 16.76***
B X C 2 .51 0.76
A X D 2 11.45 17.11***
B X D 2 8.30 12.40***
C X D 4 2.67 3.99**
A X E 1 148.51 221.89***
B X E 1 49.61 74.13***
C X E 2 3.47 5.59**
D X E 2 24.15 36.09***
A X B X C 2 1.09 1.63
A X B X D 2 7.26 10.85***
A X C X D 4 4.26 6.36***
B X C X D 4 1.38 2.06
A X B X E 1 1.90 2.84
A X C X E 2 5.72 8.54***
B X C X E 2 0.32 0.47
A X D X E 2 10.74 16.04***
B ·χ D X E 2 4.93 7.36***
C X D X E 4 3.33 4.98***
A X B' X C X D 4 0.81 1.21
A X B X C X E 2 0.97 1.45
A X B X D X E 2 6.79 10.15***
A X C X D X E 4 2.63 3.93**
B X- C X D X E 4 1.99 2.98*
AxBxCxDxE 4 1.34 2.00
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
multiple measures were BD and ID scores, taken as 
two discrete attitude points. Consequently, transfor­
med scores for individuals within groups were 
analyzed in a univariate manner along a single dimen-
TABLE 3. Discriminant Analysis for Differences between Cultures 
by Type of Task
Factor df F
Task 1 2/117 15.23'
Task 2 2/117 17.18'
Task 3 2/117 55.56'
All tasks 6/113 25.56'
* p < .001
sion. The within-group variance derived from matrix 
variations was used to compute a D2 statistic. Under 
the assumption that the original BD and ID variables 
were part of a multivariate normal distribution within 
the population from which samples were drawn, the 
D2 statistic was then interpreted within the F distribu­
tion.
The resulting discriminant function analyses for 
culture, sex of subject, and age were classified by each 
type of task and across all task types. Differences bet­
ween cultures by task type are presented in Table 3. 
The results for differences between age groups by 
culture appear in Table 4.
On the basis of a nonsignificant interaction for 
culture and sex of subject factors in the original 
analysis of variance, the comparison for sex differen­
ces in attitude scores was collapsed across cultures in 
Table 5.
While no significant interaction for culture and the 
sex of subject was found, the comparison of BD and 
ID scores by sex and culture for specific tasks yielded 
some interesting data. These data are presented in 
Table 6 as changes from BD to ID scores expressed 
as a percentage of BD scores. The percentages, by sex 
of subject and type of task, are then compared in ratio 
form.
The discriminant analyses give a more exact ac-
TABLE 4. Discriminant Analysis for Differences between Age Groups by Culture
Culture and 
comparison factors df
Task 1
F df
Task 2
F df
Task 3
F
Task 4 
df F
A merican
High school and college 2/37 0.17 2/37 6.04** 2/37 3.38* 6/33 3.82**
High school and post-college 2/37 7.21*** 2/37 4.41* 2/37 2.07 6/33 3.42**
College and post-college 2/37 5.81*** 2/37 0.18 2/37 7.30*** 6/33 4.10***
Cypriot
High school and college 2/37 0.18 2/37 1.76 2/37 2.00 6/33 1.32
High school and post-college 2/37 0.77 2/37 0.48 2/37 1.50 6/33 0.90
College and post-college 2/37 0.36 2/37 1.02 2/37 1.05 6/33 1.09
* p < .05
** p < .01 
*** p < .001
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TABLE 5. Discriminant Analysis for Differences between Sexes by 
Type of Task
Factor df F
Task 1 2/117 17.90* 
Task 2 2/1 17 2.69
Task 3 2/117 6.33*
All Tasks 6/1 13 7.10*
* p < .001
count of the effect of culture, age, and the sex of sub­
jects on the consistency phenomenon. The data in 
Table 3 show significant differences between the two 
cultures on every task (issue) and across all tasks 
combined. Differences between age groups (Table 4) 
are specific to the American cultural group, with the 
college and high school age groups differing 
consistently from the post-college age group. The 
college age group, moreover, evidenced the greatest 
divergence from the other two age groups on all tasks 
and showed the greatest consistency effect in 
discrepancy-induced attitude change (cf. Table 1).
Differences between sexes were apparent in two of 
the three tasks. Tasks 1 and 3, and across all items 
combined (see Table 5). Data in Table 6 clearly iden­
tify Task 1 in the Cypriot culture as the determining 
source of significant differences between the sexes, ac­
counting for the nonsignificant interaction for culture 
and sex of subject in the analysis of variance. The lack 
of such differences on Tasks 2 and 3 among Cypriot 
subjects should prompt some reservation in interpret­
ing the strength of that nonsignificant interaction.
discussion
The present results constitute a replication and ex­
pansion of earlier studies of the effect of sex (Gon­
zalez, 1974; Gonzalez & Davis, 1974), age (Gonzâlez,
1972; Gonzâlez & Maxwell, 1973), and cultural 
(Khokhlov & Gonzâlez, 1973; Gonzâlez & Khokhlov, 
1974) variables on the consistency phenomenon across 
several issues. As in those previous studies, it found 
much less evidence of the consistency effect among 
Greek subjects and a pronounced mediation of the ef­
fect by the sex of subjects, the issue under considera­
tion, and the age of subjects among Americans. More­
over, the pattern of the effect of these variables is con­
sistent across the various studies, despite the use of 
different paradigms (P-O-X geometric graphs, 
syllogism-like statements, several scaling techniques) to 
test the balance notion.
These composite results suggest two avenues of gen­
eral theoretical interpretation. The first, which is by far 
the more benign in its treatment of the consistency 
principle, stresses the qualifying nature of these find­
ings. Certainly, in regard to the balance phenomenon, 
the suggestion is that its theoretical structure should 
emphasize the age, sex, and cultural variables which 
contribute to the saliency of cognitions as they interact 
in the classical P-O-X triad. Following such a sugges­
tion, one might view the failure to find a balance effect 
among Cypriot subjects in the study reported as a 
mere artifact of an array of cognitions (i.e., a set of 
tasks) which inadequately tap the consistency principle 
in Cypriot culture. That is to say, while the matrix of 
cognitions used did not elicit balance responses, there 
exists the possibility that, in other matrices of interact­
ing cognitions, the balance phenomenon would be 
operative. By the same token, age and sex variables 
within a single culture may interact with a given set of 
cognitions such that balance (or consistency) is at­
tenuated or absent.
The limitations of such an avenue of interpretation 
are obvious. If, indeed, the consistency principle is a 
function of the appropriate interaction of sex and age 
variables with an ideal matrix of cognitions at some 
time T out of the set of temporal circumstances Tn, is 
•it parsimonious to refer to the principle as a universal 
«cognitive preference»? Moreover, at least in a cross-
TABLE 6. Comparison of Changes from BD to ID as Percentages of BD
Type of task American Cypriot Both cultures
and function Male Female Male Female Male Female
-33.07 -22.45 -22.76 -27.98 -1 1.59
1 to .41
-16.30 -8.38 -1.70 -1.00 -9.03 -4.74
-39.00 -19.70 -3.74 -0.0 -21.41 -9.8
* Insufficient difference for ratio expression.
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cultural sense, can one seriously defend a phenomenon 
which bases its functionality, not on observed data, 
but on the eventuality of its presence under some ideal 
conditions?
A course of interpretation less kind to the consisten­
cy principle asserts that cognitive balance may not be 
a universal trait and that, contrary to Freedman 
(1968), individuals may not always seek logical, sim­
plistic, and consistent Weltansichten. In terms of the 
assumptions of modern social psychology (from 
consistency to attribution and person perception 
theories in general), this is a revolutionary and perhaps 
hasty statement. But the findings here do lend it some 
support. Not only do Americans fail to evidence 
consistency effects at all times, but the effects are vir­
tually absent in Greek subjects. Perhaps the latter are 
able to accept and assimilate ambiguity and imbalance 
in their sentimental relationships without pejorative 
consequences and without violating some ostensible 
preferential perceptual mechanism disposing the in­
dividual towards cognitive consistency.
As for the American evidence for consistency, it is 
interesting to note that most of the studies in social 
psychology in North America draw on an experi­
mental pool of undergraduate college or university stu­
dents and. as a rule, from among psychology majors.
In the specific case of cognitive balance studies, the 
American undergraduate student, as an experimental 
subject, may tend excessively to align his attitudes and 
beliefs and balance his cognitions on the basis of sup­
portive assumptions gleaned his notions of «man the 
consistent organism». Tedeschi, Schlenker, and 
Bonoma (1971) point out that researchers in social 
science often ignore the extent to which they may be 
manipulated by the students whom they test. A stu­
dent may, therefore, show cognitive consistency in his 
response patterns as a means to satisfy the experimen­
ter's supposed understanding of traditional decision 
patterns. Support of this alternative explanation is pre­
sented by the data here, where support for the balance 
effect was especially pronounced in the American 
college age group.
The authors suggest that some effort be expended in 
the replication of the findings reported. Despite at­
tempts to vary method, analysis, and cognitive issues, 
the results thus far remain consistent. They pose a 
strong possibility that the assumption of a universally 
operative model of cognitive consistency as an irresis­
tible tendency to resolve cognitive imbalance by at­
titude realignment may be a cultural, experimental, or, 
as a result of its inadequate formulation, a theoretical 
artifact.
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